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Abstract
We have earlier shown by construction that a proposition can have a well-defined
nonzero probability, even if it is justified by an infinite probabilistic regress. We
thought this to be an adequate rebuttal of foundationalist claims that probabilis-
tic regresses must lead either to an indeterminate, or to a determinate but zero
probability. In a comment, Frederik Herzberg has argued that our counterexam-
ples are of a special kind, being what he calls ‘solvable’. In the present reaction
we investigate what Herzberg means by solvability. We discuss the advantages
and disadvantages of making solvability a sine qua non, and we ventilate our mis-
givings about Herzberg’s suggestion that the notion of solvability might help the
foundationalist.
We further show that the canonical series arising from an infinite chain of
conditional probabilities always converges, and also that the sum is equal to the
required unconditional probability if a certain infinite product of conditional prob-
abilities vanishes.
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According to classical foundationalism, an infinite probabilistic regress either
yields zero or remains indeterminate. In several papers we have given coun-
terexamples to this claim. That is, we have demonstrated that a proposition
can have a well-defined nonzero probability, even though its probabilistic
justification is forever postponed [1], [2], [3], [4].
In an interesting comment involving a pretty use of nonstandard analysis,
Frederik Herzberg [5] has proved that our counterexamples are consistent, in
the sense that they have a model. However, he also argues that they are
of a very special kind. For our counterexamples are what he calls ‘solvable’
and most consistent probabilistic regresses lack that property. Our coun-
terexamples are thus exceptional, and this leads Herzberg to conclude that
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there is a way in which a foundationalist might defend herself. For she might
now argue that generically we are unable to calculate or estimate an infi-
nite probabilistic regress explicitly. In other words, she might concede that
some propositions which are justified by a probabilistic regress can have a
well-defined nonzero probability, but still deny that this is generally the case.
In the present reply to Herzberg we will focus on the notion of solvability.
(i) We will first investigate what Herzberg means by ‘solvable’. (ii) Then
we discuss the pros and cons of the requirement that a probabilistic regress
can justify a proposition only if that regress is in fact solvable. (iii) Finally,
we consider two alternative ways in which a foundationalist might defend
herself.
(i) What does it mean to say that a probabilistic regress is solvable? Herz-
berg writes: “A probabilistic regress < α, β > is solvable if for any model
<P, S > of <α, β > one can derive a closed-form expression for P (S0).” [5,
p. 3; for the notation, see Herzberg’s Definition 2]. However, he also notes
that “[i]t is difficult to provide a precise definition of solvability, since the no-
tion of a closed-form expression is not a well-defined mathematical concept.”
(ibid.) In the first footnote of his paper Herzberg suggests that closed-form
expressions include rational numbers, but that it is unclear whether some
irrational, algebraic or transcendental numbers also fall under this heading.
“All one can say”, he writes, “is that in all of these cases, any candidate for
[a] set of closed-form expressions will be a countable set C of real numbers.”
(ibid.) Acknowledging that there is no agreement on what this set C looks
like, he concludes with a counterfactual: “if there were universal agreement
on the set C of closed-form expressions of real numbers, a candidate for a
definition of closed-form solvability would be as follows”(ibid., pp. 3-4) —
after which he defines closed-form solvability in terms of C.
In order to gain a better understanding of solvability, let us take a closer
look at the structure of our counterexamples. The typical form of these
counterexamples is:
P (S0) = A+B , (1)
where P (S0) is the probability associated with the target proposition S0, A
is an infinite series of conditional probabilities only, and B is a remainder
term, containing precisely one unconditional probability as a factor:
A = lim
s→∞{β0 + γ0β1 + γ0γ1β2 + . . .+ γ0γ1 . . . γs−1βs}
B = lim
s→∞{γ0γ1 . . . γs P (Ss+1)} (2)
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(for the meaning of the symbols β and γ see Herzberg’s [5] and our [2]).
Following Herzberg, we shall say that Eq.(1) is solvable if and only if we
can write down a closed-form expression for the sum A + B, for example
an expression in terms of a finite number of rational terms. Now it can be
proved that the infinite series of conditional probabilities A always converges,
so A certainly is equal to a unique and well-defined number (for a proof, see
Appendix A). Moreover, in the usual cases B will tend to zero (see Appendix
B). This means that, as a rule, the infinite regress of conditional probabilities
produces a convergent series that is equal to the unconditional probability
of the target proposition S0. In other words: as a rule the unique and well-
defined value of A coincides with P (S0).
From this it does not follow, however, that this unique value can actu-
ally be written down as a closed-form expression consisting only of known
functions. It might after all be an expression outside Herzberg’s set C. In
general the structure P (S0) = A + B is solvable if we can write the unique
value of A in an acceptable closed form. Since mostly we are not able to do
this, we agree with Herzberg that most convergent series are not solvable in
his sense. The generic case is indeed one in which an infinite probabilistic
regress yields a convergent series, the sum of which cannot be written down
in a closed form based on familiar functions.
(ii) In Herzberg’s view, this might help the foundationalist. For she can
now argue that most probabilistic regresses are unsolvable and thus that our
solvable counterexamples form an exceptional class. At the end of his paper
Herzberg concludes that the generic, unsolvable probabilistic regresses could
produce a very small number: “for a given regress, P (S0) might be very
close to zero” [5, last sentence]. He thus suggests that, while the solvable
regresses yield a non-zero value for P (S0), the unsolvable ones might confer on
this probability uncontrollably tiny values. But this suggestion could easily
mislead the reader. As we see from Eqs. (1)-(2), the value of P (S0) cannot
be smaller than β0. Whenever the latter is not very close to zero, P (S0)
will not be close to zero either. Since this goes for solvable and unsolvable
regresses alike, most of the generic, unsolvable regresses will thus not end up
close to zero, much as in the case of nongeneric, solvable regresses.
A foundationalist might react to this by banning unsolvable regresses
altogether. Indeed, if she is a rigid constructivist, she would doubt the very
existence of such regresses, so she will certainly not acknowledge them as
potential counterexamples in our sense.
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How reasonable is the position of this constructive foundationalist? In or-
der to answer this question, we should bear in mind that invoking solvability
carries with it two moments of choice. First, we must choose a definition of
solvability, which in this case amounts to specifying Herzberg’s set C. Which
expressions are we supposed to include and which are we supposed to leave
out? As Herzberg notes, there is no clear answer to this question. Second,
and independently of what solvability looks like, we must decide whether
or not we require counterexamples to be solvable. A rigid constructivist, as
we have seen, will indeed require solvability as a sine qua non. For her, a
probabilistic regress justifies a proposition only if its sum can be written as a
closed-form expression. We are however inclined to take a laxer stance. It is
true that most of our counterexamples yield rational numbers and thus are
solvable in Herzberg’s sense. But this is only an accidental feature, intro-
duced for reasons of simplicity and immediate intelligibility. We never meant
solvability to be an essential characteristic of our counterexamples.
Of course, demanding that only solvable series can be counterexamples
has the advantage of ensuring that the latter are easily calculable. But the
demand has obvious drawbacks as well. If interpreted narrowly, it would
exclude the use of many known and unknown higher functions. Isn’t it stan-
dard practice to define transcendental numbers and functions by means of
convergent series, by integral transforms, or by other unsolvable, but calcu-
lable expressions? And are there not infinitely many other new transforms
that can be computed? Personally we see no good reason to ban any of them;
but this is after all more a matter of taste than a matter of fact.
(iii) Assuming that a constructivist approach does not really help our hy-
pothetical foundationalist, what other lifelines are available to her? We can
think of two. The infinite product γ0γ1γ2 . . . normally diverges to zero (see
Appendix B), so that the term B in Eq.(1) vanishes. However — and this
is the first lifeline — a foundationalist might wish to claim that a ‘prime
mover’ (Ss+1 in the limit s → ∞, thus infinitely far away) is still required
to bring the whole epistemic chain into existence, even though the stochas-
tic support that it gives to S0 has shrivelled away to nothing. If she were to
grasp this lifeline, the foundationalist would commit herself to a position that
we might call ‘epistemological deism’. Seventeenth and eighteenth century
deists preached that God created the world, including the laws of nature, but
waived any interference after that. In a similar vein, our counterexamples
postulate an infinitely remote beginning of the justificatory regress, but deny
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that this beginning has any influence whatsoever on the probability value of
the target proposition. All justification for the target proposition stems from
the conditional probabilities that make up the infinite series A.
Any foundationalist who feels uncomfortable with this meagre option
might choose the second lifeline. She could seek solace in the atypical case
where the infinite product γ0γ1γ2 . . . (and thus B) converges to a value that
is not zero. The general expression (1) for the required probability leads to
P (S0) = β0 +
∞∑
n=1
βn
n−1∏
s=0
γs + P
∗
∞∏
n=0
γn ,
where
P ∗ = lim
n→∞P (Sn) ,
on condition that this limit exists. In order to calculate P (S0) we need
now not only the conditional probabilities, but also P ∗, the unconditional
probability associated with an infinitely distant prime mover; for the latter
still exerts probabilistic influence on the value of P (S0).
However, the second lifeline comes with a price tag. For not only is this
class atypical, it is also characterized by a sequence, {γn}, that tends very
rapidly to unity as n tends to infinity. This means that βn tends very rapidly
to zero, and αn = βn + γn tends very rapidly to one. If it were the case that
αn = 1 and βn = 0 exactly for some n, then the relation between Sn and Sn+1
would be one of bi-implication, Sn ←→ Sn+1, thus guaranteeing that Sn and
Sn+1 have the same truth values. Stochastically speaking, the link between
the two propositions has been short-circuited, and the same would apply to
any link for which the corresponding γn is precisely equal to one. If however
γn is not precisely equal to one, but tends asymptotically very quickly to
that value, we might dub the relation between successive propositions in the
epistemic chain, at any rate for sufficiently large values of n, one of quasi-
bi-implication. For small values of n the values of γn might depart radically
from unity, so we have the finite beginnings of a normal epistemic chain. The
infinite tail, however, would be one of quasi-bi-implication. In other words,
all but a finite part of the chain is approximately short-circuited through to
the ground. The probabilistic chain might be called quasi-finite, and it could
perhaps serve as a generalization of the standard foundationalist requirement
that the series of justification be finite. However, this option seems little more
than a simple reformulation of the foundationalist stance and thus appears
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to come close to begging the question of whether justification by probabilistic
regress is possible.
Appendix A. Proof that the series converges
The unconditional probabilities P (Sn) and P (Sn+1) are related by the rule
of total probability,
P (Sn) = βn + γnP (Sn+1) , (3)
where
βn = P (Sn|¬Sn+1) and γn = P (Sn|Sn+1)− P (Sn|¬Sn+1) , (4)
with γn > 0 for all n, which is the condition of probabilistic support. Eq.(3)
can be iterated from n = 0 up to n = s, with the result1
P (S0) = β0 +
s∑
n=1
γ0γ1 . . . γn−1βn + γ0γ1 . . . γsP (Ss+1) . (5)
In the limit that one lets s go to infinity, the resulting infinite series is in
fact convergent, as we will now prove. Since βn + γn = P (Sn|Sn+1) ≤ 1 , it
follows that βn ≤ 1− γn, and so
s∑
n=1
γ0γ1 . . . γn−1βn ≤
s∑
n=1
γ0γ1 . . . γn−1(1− γn)
= (γ0 − γ0γ1) + (γ0γ1 − γ0γ1γ2) + . . .+ (γ0γ1 . . . γs−1 − γ0γ1 . . . γs)
= γ0 − γ0γ1 . . . γs ≤ γ0 , (6)
which is finite and independent of s, and therefore also valid in the limit that
s is taken to infinity. Since all the βn are nonnegative and all the γn are
positive, it follows that the infinite series of positive terms
A = β0 +
∞∑
n=1
γ0γ1 . . . γn−1βn
1Formula (5) can be formally proved by mathematical induction as follows:
1. Since P (S0) = β0 + γ0P (S1), Eq.(5) is clearly true when s = 0.
2. Suppose P (S0) = β0+
∑s−1
n=1 γ0γ1 . . . γn−1βn+γ0γ1 . . . γs−1P (Ss) for some s. Then,
on substituting βs + γsP (Ss+1) for P (Ss) in this formula, we obtain the right-hand
side of Eq.(5).
Therefore, if (5) is true for some s, it is true for any larger value of s. But it is true for
s = 0, so it is true for s = 1, 2, 3 . . ..
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is convergent, for the partial sums (6) are bounded by γ0.
Appendix B. When does the remainder term vanish?
Consider the remainder term in Eq.(5), namely γ0γ1 . . . γsP (Ss+1) . We will
show that the coefficient in front of P (Ss+1), i.e. γ0γ1 . . . γs, usually tends to
zero in the infinite s limit. Since γn = exp[ log γn] = exp[−| log γn| ],
γ0γ1γ2γ3 . . . =
∞∏
n=0
γn = exp
[
−
∞∑
n=0
| log γn|
]
. (7)
So γ0γ1 . . . γs has the limit zero as s goes to infinity if and only if the sum
∞∑
n=0
| log γn| (8)
diverges. Since all the terms in the series (8) are positive, the series can only
converge, or diverge to +∞. Unless γn tends very quickly to 1, the series will
indeed diverge; hence an infinite product of terms, each of which is smaller
than one, is usually equal to zero. In this case
B = lim
s→∞{γ0γ1 . . . γsP (Ss+1)}
is also zero, since P (Ss+1) is bounded by unity.
Exceptionally, if γn tends rapidly to 1, this will not be the case. For
example, if
1− γn ∼ n−a as n→∞ ,
then the sum (8) converges if a > 1, but it diverges if 0 < a ≤ 1. If γn
tends less quickly still to one, or does not tend to unity at all, which may be
regarded as ‘usual’, the series is divergent, and by convention one says that
the corresponding infinite product (7) diverges to zero.
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